In the case of Cleveland Police Patrolmen’s Assn. v. Cleveland, 2023-Ohio-71, the appellate court found that the union was improperly using the Declaratory Judgment Act (R.C. Chapter 2721) to circumvent binding contractual and administrative procedures regarding the police officer discipline process.
In this case, the union argued that the city should be prohibited from disciplining a police officer arguing that the public safety director failed to comply with the applicable civil service discipline rule with respect to a police officer. In response, the city argued that the union was not challenging the legality of the civil service rule but, rather, was simply using the judicial system to circumvent the collectively bargained grievance procedures by challenging the discipline decision of the public safety director under the civil service rule, but before the director could even render a decision on the disciplinary issue. The appellate court agreed with the city.
In support of its decision in favor of the city, the appellate court explained that:
By filing the complaint seeking declaratory relief before [the director of public safety] could render a decision on the disciplinary issue, the [union] asked the trial court to essentially usurp the authority of the director of public safety to render a decision on the preferred charges, including applicability of [the civil service rule], thereby circumventing the grievance procedure and any binding arbitration attendant to that grievance procedure. The complaint in this case did not seek any declaration as to the construction or validity of [the civil service rule], but instead impermissibly asked the trial court to intervene into the administrative and collective bargaining process by rendering its conclusion as to whether [the civil service rule] applied to the facts presented to [the police officer] at the pre-disciplinary hearing. This is well beyond the scope of the R.C. Chapter 2721. When the scope of the Declaratory Judgment Act is exceeded, the proper remedy is to dismiss the action.
2023-Ohio-71 at ¶ 14.
To read this case, click here.
Authors: Matthew John Markling and the McGown & Markling Team.
Note: This blog entry does not constitute – nor does it contain – legal advice. Legal jurisprudence is like the always-changing Midwestern weather. As a result, this single blog entry cannot substitute for consultation with a McGown & Markling attorney. If legal advice is needed with respect to a specific factual situation, please feel free to contact a McGown & Markling attorney.