In the case of Gohl v. Livona Public School Dist., No. 16a0226p.06 (6th Cir. Sept. 8, 2016), a federal appellate court found that the parent of a student with hydrocephalus did not present enough evidence to establish a constitutional violation where the special education teacher allegedly engaged in classroom conduct that witnesses complained of as overly harsh.
In Gohl, employees reported that the teacher engaged in, among other things, the following mistreatment of students: (1) holding their faces or chins tightly and yelling in their faces, (2) subjecting lower functioning students to rough treatment, and (3) force feeding a gagging and crying student. With respect to plaintiff’s son, a social worker alleged that the teacher grabbed the top of his head and jerked it back quite aggressively while yelling “You need to listen.” The teacher denied this accusation, claiming she was using an education technique called “redirecting” to focus the student’s attention after he threw a ring-stacking toy.
The parent filed suit alleging several claims, including an allegation that the teacher violated the student’s right under the Fourteenth Amendment to be free from excessive force. The federal appellate court concluded that the teacher’s conduct did not meet the high standard necessary to prove a constitutional violation. While the teacher’s educational and disciplinary methods may have been, according to the court, inappropriate and insensitive, they were not unconstitutional.
Among the factors that the court examined in reaching this conclusion, the most significant appears to be that the teacher had a “pedagogical justification” for her conduct. As stated above, the teacher alleged that she “used an established education technique, ‘redirecting,’ to make [the student] pick up a ring-stacking toy he had knocked off a table.” This, and other cases involving allegations of educator misconduct, suggest that courts will be less inclined to find a constitutional violation where the teacher can trace the conduct to some educational or disciplinary purpose. In the absence of such justification, courts are left to conclude that the underlying conduct is inspired solely by malice or sadism.
To read this case, please click here.
Authors: Matthew John Markling and Patrick Vrobel
Note: This blog entry does not constitute – nor does it contain – legal advice. Legal jurisprudence is like the always changing Midwestern weather. As a result, this single blog entry cannot substitute for consultation with a McGown & Markling attorney. If legal advice is needed with respect to a specific factual situation, please feel free to contact a McGown & Markling attorney.