In the case of State ex. rel. Cassens Corp. v. Indus. Comm., 2022-Ohio-2936, the appellate court granted a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the Industrial Commission of Ohio to vacate its order finding that an employer had violated a specific safety requirement relating to an injury an employee sustained in a case brought by the injured employee for a VSSR award.
To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, a relator must show a clear legal right to the relief sought by showing that there was an abuse of discretion in entering an order which was not supported by the record, and by showing that the commission had a clear legal duty to provide such relief. In applying for a VSSR award, the claimant bears the burden of establishing “(1) a specific safety requirement exists; (2) the employer failed to comply with the requirement; and (3) the failure to comply was the cause of the injury in question.”
Here, an employee was walking through an outdoor yard at a Chrysler Group Yard facility when he was struck by a vehicle driven by a coworker who was driving with snow covering the windshield, which was a violation of work rules. The employee filed an application for a VSSR award, arguing that his employer violated Ohio Admin. Code 4123:1-5-13(C)(4), which relates to motor vehicle cab glass. The Commission granted the employee’s application and the employer petitioned for a writ of mandamus.
The Court disagreed with the commission and reasoned that the outdoor yard at the Chrysler Group Yard did not constitute a “workshop,” which is a requirement for a VSSR award to be granted under Ohio Admin. Code 4123:1-5-13. The standard for determining whether a place of employment is a workshop or factory under Ohio Admin. Code 4123:1-5 is a finding of fact to first be made by the commission, subject to review by the courts for only an abuse of discretion. The Court held that the evidence showed no part of the manufacturing process was completed at this yard, which falls under the definition of “workshop” interpreted by the Supreme Court of Ohio, as its primary purpose was to store newly manufactured vehicles before transport to dealers.
To read this case, click here.
Authors: Matthew John Markling and the McGown & Markling Team.
Note: This blog entry does not constitute – nor does it contain – legal advice. Legal jurisprudence is like the always-changing Midwestern weather. As a result, this single blog entry cannot substitute for consultation with a McGown & Markling attorney. If legal advice is needed with respect to a specific factual situation, please feel free to contact a McGown & Markling attorney.