In the case of Ingram v. Glavin, 2023-Ohio-1290, an appellate court held that the substitute did not have a viable case for wrongful termination, retaliation, and breach of fiduciary duty when the substitute did not exhaust other remedies, did not show there was an adverse employment action, and there was no fiduciary duty owed.
In this case, the substitute argued that the school board (1) wrongfully terminated the substitute when the board removed the substitute’s right to further work and volunteer at the school, (2) removed the substitute’s right to further work and volunteer at the school in retaliation for the substitute reporting that the school board’s no-contact directive as “harassment,” and (3) the school board breached its fiduciary duty to the substitute by failing to act a neutral arbiter when handling the harassment and no-contact dispute. In response, the school board argued that (1) the substitute did not exhaust the statutory remedies, (2) the substitute did not show the restrictions were an adverse employment action, and (3) the school board did not owe the substitute a fiduciary duty when adhering to the anti-harassment policy. The appellate court agreed with the school board.
In support of its decision in favor of the school board on the wrongful termination claim, the appellate court explained that, because the substitute failed to exhaust existing statutory remedies for wrongful termination under R.C. 4112, the substitute’s wrongful termination claim in the lower court was legally unrecognizable.
In support of its decision in favor of the school board on the retaliation claim, the appellate court explained that the substitute failed to establish a prima facie case for retaliation when the substitute failed to show that the substitution and volunteer restriction constituted more than just a mere inconvenience and instead arose to the level of an adverse employment action.
In support of its decision in favor of the school board on the breach of fiduciary duty claim, the appellate court explained that the school board’s duty to adhere to the anti-harassment policy and to be an impartial arbiter did not create a fiduciary duty between the school board and the substitute.
To read this case, click here.
Authors: Matthew John Markling and the McGown & Markling Team.
Note: This blog entry does not constitute – nor does it contain – legal advice. Legal jurisprudence is like the always-changing Midwestern weather. As a result, this single blog entry cannot substitute for consultation with a McGown & Markling attorney. If legal advice is needed with respect to a specific factual situation, please feel free to contact a McGown & Markling attorney.