It is a basic principle of education law that a contract is not enforceable against a board of education unless it is approved at a regular or special meeting. The case of Toledo City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Toledo Fedn. of Teachers, AFT Local 250, 2016-Ohio-7807, demonstrates that this principle applies with equal force to collective bargaining agreements.
In Toledo, an Ohio appellate court found that an arbitrator exceeded his authority in determining that the board of education was bound by agreements reached by two negotiators in a special education subcommittee. At issue in the case were negotiations related to special education teachers. Because the parties knew that the main negotiations would likely end up in fact-finding, which could potentially interfere with the delivery of special education services at the start of the new school year, the parties negotiated the special education issues away from the main bargaining table. The dispute arose because, while the lead negotiator for the teachers’ union had full authority to bind the union, the lead negotiator for the board did not have such authority and was instructed that any recommendations brought to the main bargaining table had to be cost neutral. The union filed a grievance after the board refused to implement certain provisions agreed to by the special education subcommittee involving the payment of fees for the preparation of initial IEPs.
The Ohio appellate court held “that while R.C. Chapter 4117 governs the collective bargaining agreement process, it does not usurp the statutory limitations placed upon boards of education regarding their contractual authority. No contract is binding upon a board of education unless it acts as a body to make or authorize a contract at a regular or special meeting.” Toledo at ¶ 24. And “[s]ince the Board never considered nor approved the recommendations of the special education committee regarding the IEP compensation or release time, those recommendations did not become part of the collective bargaining agreement.” Toledo at ¶ 25.
This case serves as a reminder that parties conducting business with boards of education, even in the area of collective bargaining, should always be aware of the limits with which a board can conduct business. Specifically, a board of education cannot be bound by the oral promises of its agents. No contract is binding on a board of education unless it is approved at a regular or special meeting.
To read this case, please click here.
Authors: Matthew John Markling and Patrick Vrobel
Note: This blog entry does not constitute – nor does it contain – legal advice. Legal jurisprudence is like the always changing Midwestern weather. As a result, this single blog entry cannot substitute for consultation with a McGown & Markling attorney. If legal advice is needed with respect to a specific factual situation, please feel free to contact a McGown & Markling attorney.