In the case of Burks v. Dayton Public Schools BOE, 2023-Ohio-1227, an appellate court held that a principal failed to state claims for both IIED and breach of fiduciary duty against a school board and the school board’s lawyer when the board’s lawyer revealed information that the board and principal had agreed would remain confidential contingent upon the principal’s early retirement.
In this case, the principal argued that (1) the lawyer had a fiduciary duty to the principal because the lawyer was assisting the board in breaching a fiduciary duty by revealing confidential information; (2) the board members acted outside the scope of official duties; (3) the board was not engaged in a governmental function, which would negate immunity; and (4) the IIED claim was satisfied by a showing that action taken by the board was intentional. In response, the lawyer argued that (1) there was no fiduciary duty between the board and principal, so there was also no fiduciary duty between the lawyer and the principal. The board members argued that (2) the hiring and firing of principals is within the scope of official duties for a board. The board argued that (3) hearings for employment are governmental functions because they are quasi-judicial proceedings and (4) no conduct rose to the level of extreme and outrageous. The appellate court agreed with the lawyers, board members, and the board.
In support of its decision in favor of the lawyer, the appellate court explained that the principal did not establish a fiduciary duty between the lawyer and the principal because the lawyer was performing under a duty to the board, not to the principal.
In support of its decision in favor of the board members, the appellate court explained that the board of education had begun the process of termination proceedings under R.C. 3319.16; therefore the actions of the board members were within the scope of the board’s hiring and firing of teachers and principals.
In support of its decision in favor of the board, the appellate court explained that a hearing under R.C. 3319.16 is a quasi-judicial proceeding, which is a governmental function; as such, promissory estoppel is inapplicable against the board as a political subdivision engaged in a governmental function. The appellate court further explained that, as a matter of law, no actions by the board or its members rose “to the level of being so extreme and outrageous as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” 2023-Ohio-1127 at ¶ 53.
To read this case, click here.
Authors: Matthew John Markling and the McGown & Markling Team.
Note: This blog entry does not constitute – nor does it contain – legal advice. Legal jurisprudence is like the always-changing Midwestern weather. As a result, this single blog entry cannot substitute for consultation with a McGown & Markling attorney. If legal advice is needed with respect to a specific factual situation, please feel free to contact a McGown & Markling attorney.